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Promotion, Incentives, and Wages
Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Tetsuya Maruyama
11.1 Introduction
In many advanced countries, there is a growing interest in the relation-
ship between incentive pay and careers in organizations, and in particular
between incentive pay and promotion on the hierarchical ladder. There
aret wo main reasons for this: First, theoretical economists in general are
interested in ﬁrms, contracts, incentives, performance, and the like. Sec-
ond, a number of surveys on wages, positions, performance, and other fea-
tures of individual employees have become available recently. These sur-
veyse nable economists to conduct rigorous empirical studies more eﬃ-
ciently than aggregate data did.
This paper investigates the story of Japanese ﬁrm experience with incen-
tive pay. Since both the aging of the Japanese population and the slower
growth rate of Japanese ﬁrms force those ﬁrms to reduce the cost of labor
(by decreasing the total wage cost), the system must not reduce the work
incentives of employees who may see a decrease in their average wages.
In Japan it has been understood that the average labor productivity of
manual (blue-collar) workers is quite high, while that of nonmanual (white-
collar) workers is considerably lower than it is in other industrialized na-
tions. There are several convincing reasons for this belief. First, team pro-
duction is common among manual workers in manufacturing, and such a
system is apt to increase labor productivity because neither strong leader-
ship nor excellent contribution by a single person is required. In other
words,a mong manual workers everyone is motivated to raise the average
productivity. Second, nonmanufacturing industries in which the majority
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335of workers are white-collar exhibit lower labor productivity; that implies
that the average labor productivity of white-collar workers is lower than
that of blue-collar workers. Third, leadership, individual contributions,
and the workers’ skills are all crucial in determining productivity of white-
collar workers who are engaged in complicated jobs. Fourth, compressed
wage dispersion among workers and a seniority-based promotion system,
two representative features of the industrial relations system in Japan, are
relevant for manual workers, but not suitable for white-collar workers.1
This study examines whether that latter statement is true for white-collar
workers.
11.2 Theoretical and Empirical Facts on Incentives and Careers
Twoi mportant articles focusing on the United States deal with the rela-
tionship between incentive pay and careers in organizations (Gibbons
1997; Prendergast 1999). This section therefore relates strictly to the expe-
rience of Japan. In particular, we ask, “Does pay vary with performance,
and do incentives matter, particularly for white-collar workers?”
Twoi mportant earlier studies investigated the issues of insurance, con-
tracts, and incentives in Japan: Mitani (1998) and Ito and Teruyuma
(1998). It is useful to summarize their ﬁndings here. Mitani investigated
the positive and the negative eﬀects of the incentive for wages and promo-
tion on employees in terms of individual and ﬁrm performance. Workers
whoa re fond of risk-taking, and who clearly understand the relationship
between incentive and performance, are aﬀected positively; workers who
are risk averse and who do not appreciate the eﬀect of incentives on their
performance are aﬀected negatively. Mitani found that the Japanese incen-
tive system was at an optimal level, balancing the positive and the negative
eﬀects perfectly.
Ito and Teruyama (1998) were concerned with the economic eﬀect of
job tenure on wages and promotion. They found that no single theory
could explain this relationship perfectly. These two studies were important,
however, because they were the ﬁrst attempts (at least for Japan) to depart
from human capital as the sole background theory for explaining wage
diﬀerentials.2
Jobt enure in Japan has a particularly strong eﬀecto nthe determination
of wages and promotion. Wages increase almost proportionately with job
tenure in the ﬁrm and decrease after a certain point.3 The inﬂuence of job
tenure also has been examined in the determination of promotion along
1. See Lazear (1989) about the implication of compressed wage dispersion.
2. The theory of human capital had been dominant in Japan for a long time, although
some dissatisfaction with it has been addressed (e.g., Ishikawa 1992; Tachibanaki 1996).
3. Many empirical studies have attempted to determine the role of tenure in the determina-
tion of wages. See, for example, Mincer and Higuchi (1988) and Tachibanaki (1996).
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and promotion is called the seniority rule in Japan, and is one of the most
important institutional features in industrial relations.
Currently there is a shift of interest in the role of job tenure from wages
to promotion. There are two conﬂicting views on the questions “Who is
promoted?” and “What are the main criteria for the determination of pro-
motion?” The ﬁrst view gives the role of job tenure (seniority) and the
performance of the individual employee almost equal signiﬁcance.4 The
second view emphasizes the performance of the individual employee over
seniority.5
Of course, promotion rates diﬀer by industry and depend on the growth
rate of the ﬁrm. Tomita (1992) looks at bank, while Ohtake (1995) and
Ariga and his coauthors (1997) study electric ﬁrms which have consider-
ably higher growth rates in their sales and their employment.6 Promotion
policies also diﬀer among the particular ﬁrms, even in the same industry
and with similar growth rates. Matsushige (1998) shows that seniority
plays a very important role for those with ten to thirteen years of job
tenure, even in one very large electric company with a growth rate that is
only moderate. In that ﬁrm, no one is promoted before accumulating those
ten to thirteen years of tenure.
Our data cover various industries. Thus, we can avoid the eﬀect ofa
speciﬁc industry’s experience on the results. Also, the data include diﬀer-
entr ates of ﬁrm growth, although we consider only larger ﬁrms.
One interesting question is the role of education in promotion rates. It
may be a signaling eﬀect, in the sense that only university graduates will
be promoted and non–university graduates will have a very slim chance of
promotion. This is particularly true in larger ﬁrms (see, e.g., Tachibanaki
1996). There is also the issue of “what university he or she graduated
from.” Academic credentials, that is, the name of the university, matter to
ac onsiderable extent in the determination of promotion.7 In sum, educa-
tion plays a special role in promotions, particularly in Japan.
Some natural questions arise after these issues are examined. First, what
is the eﬀecto fp osition or promotion on wage increases? How are wages
distributed among workers who are promoted to higher positions versus
those who are not? Second, do early promotions or quick wage increases
better induce higher motivation and work incentives, and thus raise indi-
vidual productivity? Which is more inﬂuential in determining workers’ in-
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4. Tomita (1992) is a typical example of this view.
5. See Ohtake (1995), Ariga, Ohkusa, and Brunello (1997), Bruderl, Diekman, and Prei-
sendo ¨rfer (1991), and Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b) for the United States; they
ﬁnd a “fast track” or “serial correlation” in promotion rates.
6. See also Ohashi and Matsushige (1994) for the eﬀecto fﬁ rm growth rate on promotion.
7. See, for example, Tachibanaki (1998a) and Ohashi (1998). This also can be interpreted
in the framework of favoritism, as in Prendergast and Topel (1996).centives, position or remuneration? Third, how do diﬀerent positions on
the hierarchical ladder aﬀect incentives?
11.3 Model Speciﬁcation
This section presents three basic models that describe the relationship
of promotions and wages. The three models are presented in the appendix.
Model I shows the relationship between promotion and incentive. In
particular, it gets at whether a promotion raises a worker’s incentive, ex-
pressed as EFFORT. Put more simply, doesa ne m ployee who has been
successful in his career (promoted to a higher position) work hard and
eﬃciently, or simply respond to higher incentives? Of course, there is the
possibility of the inverse causality, in which a highly motivated and hard-
working employee is more likelyt ob ep r o m o t e d .B o t hq u e s t i o n sa r ep o s e d
in Model I.
Model II considers a similar problem. The crucial diﬀerence, however,
is that it investigates the relationship between incentives and wages rather
than between promotion and incentives. The diﬀerence between promo-
tion and wages in terms of their eﬀect one ﬀort (incentives) can be esti-
mated by comparing the empirical results of Model I and Model II.
It is likely that these three variables—promotion, incentive, and
wages—are jointly determined. In other words, they may be endogenous.
Therefore, Model III is a simultaneous equation model. Both Model I and
Model II are also simultaneous equations models, despite the fact that
they have only two endogenous variables, respectively.
One important feature of this study is the discrete nature of several of
the endogenous variables. Typically, promotion is deﬁned by zero (not pro-
moted)o ro ne (promoted). This discrete nature must be considered with a
simultaneous equation framework.
Finally, we adopt a large number of exogenous (independent) variables
in estimating these models. These include not only demographic variables
for each employee, such as education, job tenure, and the like, but also
several subjective evaluations and preferences for promotion and the in-
centiveso fe ach employee. These subjective variables are expected to an-
swer the following questions: “What variables are inﬂuential?” and, “What
variables are not important in the determination of the relationship among
promotion, incentive, and wages?”
11.4 Data and Institutional Features
Thed atau sed in this study come from a survey conducted in 1993 of
white-collar employees in ﬁve large ﬁrms: an automobile manufacturer, an
electronics manufacturing company, a chemical ﬁrm, an electric power
company, and a department store. The sample includes not only manage-
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ees whow ere not promoted. In total, 2,100 questionnaires were sent to
employees, and there were 1,816 responses. The high response rate, 86.5
percent, was achieved because both the ﬁrms and the labor unions helped
us greatly.
It is useful to describe several institutional features that govern the pro-
motional system in large ﬁrms in Japan in order to understand the empiri-
calr esults. First, seniority (job tenure) has been quitei mportant in de-
termining the promotions to certain positions, and is still important in
somei n dustries.8
Second, strict promotion proceeds vertically, from ordinary worker (not
promoted), to section head (kakari-cho), to department head (kacho), to
director (bucho), and ﬁnally to executive (torishimariyaku). In many
cases, deputy positions serve as preparation for department heads and di-
rectors. A section is the smallest employee unit, consisting of roughly two
to ﬁve members. A department is the intermediate unit, consisting of
roughly ﬁve to thirty members. A directorate is the largest unit, consisting
of roughly twenty to one hundred or even more members. The number of
members in each section, department, and directorate diﬀers considerably
from ﬁrm to ﬁrm.
Third, several types of department heads have no subordinates. In other
words, they have only the titles without any supervisory tasks. Neverthe-
less, they are treated almost exactly like department heads with regard to
qualiﬁcations and grades, which determine wage payments. In many cases,
they work as specialists rather than managers.
Why would ﬁrms establish department heads who do not have any sub-
ordinates? First, the aging trend in the population plus the slower growth
rate of ﬁrms has reduced the available number of department head posi-
tions. In other words, ﬁrms are unable to promote a large number of em-
ployees to department heads unless there are changes in ﬁrms’ hierarchical
structures. Second, employees who have not been promoted to department
heads for those reasons may lose their incentive to work because of their
lower wages and a lower degree of responsibility. Third, the seniority sys-
tem, which guarantees promotion of all employees to department head,
may ensure a good working environment within the ﬁrm. Finally, there are
severali mportant and specialized jobs that can be done without subordi-
nates, and there is an increasing trend toward these jobs in many ﬁrms.
These four conditions havee ncouraged ﬁrms to create the position of de-
partment head with no subordinates. Employees are entitled to be called
department heads, and they receive nearly the same amount of wages as
those department heads who do have subordinates.
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8. See for example, Tachibanaki (1982) for earlier studies that showed the importance
of seniority.11.5 Empirical Results
Tables 11.1 through 11.12 present the estimated results for the three
models. Many of the tables include two or three estimated results sepa-
rated from those for the full samples. These estimates are according to
position in the hierarchical ladder of a ﬁrm, and are done for all employees,
employees who are section heads or higher (thus being promoted to de-
partment head), and employees who are department heads or higher (be-
ing promoted to director or deputy director). These distinctions are quite
important, because the positions are crucial in determining promotion
possibility, incentives, and wages. When there are several endogenous vari-
ables in the model, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method is applied.
When oneo fthe dependent variables is deﬁned discretely, special meth-
ods, such as the two-step Heckman method, are undertaken in addition to
the 2SLS.
Table 11.1 shows the estimated eﬀortf unction calculated by the ordi-
Table 11.1 Model I, Estimated Eﬀort Function (OLS)






















Source: Data are from Tachibanaki and Maruyama (1993).
Notes: See appendix for an explanation of variables. Figures in parentheses are standard
errors. For sample A, samples are restricted to employees who occupy section head positions
or higher. The number of observations is 352. For sample B, samples are restricted to employ-
ees whoo c cupy department head positions or higher. The number of observations is 150.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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higher positions increases eﬀort (provides incentives) among white-collar
employees. Table 11.2 shows the promotion function estimated by the
probit method. Since these tables do not take into account the simultaneity
property, we discuss them only brieﬂy. The estimated results, nevertheless,
reveal several interesting points.
First, the eﬀect of promotion on incentive for eﬀort is statistically insig-
niﬁcant in both samples. Put simply, promoted employees do not feel a
strong incentive for eﬀort. This is somewhat surprising, because it is con-
trary to common beliefs, and because employers expect that promoted
employees will be highly motivated.
Second, job tenure or the number of years before reaching section head
is positive and signiﬁcant for promotion to department head, while it is
negative and signiﬁcant or statistically insigniﬁcant for promotion to direc-
toro rdeputy director. This distinction suggests that the seniority system
works, at least for the promotion to department heads, while it does not
workf or further promotions.
Third, the number of job sections in which a worker is placed before
being promoted to department head is positive and signiﬁcant for promo-
tion to department head. Thus, capable employees who are promoted to
very high positions change their sections more frequently than others. This
is consistent with the understanding in Japan that employers try to assign
capablew hite-collar employees to many diﬀerent job sections in order to
provide them with an opportunity to learn a wide range of business activi-
ties in the ﬁrm. This is called a wide career pattern (see Kioke 1991).
Tables 11.3 through 11.5 present the estimated results taking into con-
sideration the simultaneity property. Tables 11.3 and 11.4 are based on
Lee’s method, while table 11.5 is based on Heckman’s two-step method.
Tables 11.3 and 11.4 indicate that the constant term is signiﬁcantly higher
fore m ployees who are promoted to department head (sample A in table
11.3) than for employees who are not promoted (sample A in table 11.4).
Thus, promoted employees show higher eﬀort than nonpromoted employ-
ees.T he results using Heckman’s method also support this observation
because PROS (the inverse Mills ratio) is positive and signiﬁcant. It is
interesting to note, however, that the estimated result for promotion to
director or deputy director is not consistent with the above ﬁnding. Per-
haps this is because those positions, which are higher than department
head, are normally occupied by very capable and ambitious people. There-
fore, it ish a r dt ob e l i eve that they haved i ﬀerent incentive eﬀorts or motiva-
tions; everyone in very high positions is well motivated.
Several noteworthy observations regarding the eﬀecto fe ach explana-
tory variable on the incentive eﬀort follow. The eﬀecto fw ages atisfaction
(SAWD) is negative on incentive eﬀort, while the eﬀecto fthe future pro-
motion prospective (PROSD) is positive. The former suggests that wages
do not havea n ye ﬀect, while the latter implies that when employees feel
Promotion, Incentives, and Wages 341Table 11.2 Model I, Estimated Promotion Function (probit)


















































Source: Data are from Tachibanaki and Maruyama (1993).
Notes: See table 11.1.that there is a good chance of future promotion they show a strong incen-
tive for eﬀort.
Second, the eﬀect of bothw a g ed i ﬀerentials (WVARD) and diﬀerentia-
tion in promotion (PVARD) among colleagues employed in the same year
is not statistically signiﬁcant. However, the eﬀect of the propensity to pro-
mote (OPD) and of the satisfaction with wage payment (STD) are positive
on eﬀort incentive for samples who have been promoted to section head
and on those competing for department head. The latter ﬁnding suggests
that the eﬀect on eﬀort incentive diﬀers according to one’s hierarchical po-
sition.T his is also conﬁrmed by the signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of the rec-
ognition of promotion possibility among workers (PNOTICED) on eﬀort
incentive for samples who have been promoted to section head and for
those competing for department head, and by the signiﬁcantly negative ef-
fect of the same variable for samples who have been already promoted to
department head.
In summary, the eﬀecto fw ages is signiﬁcant only for samples who so
farh aven ot been promoted. The eﬀecto fs atisfaction with wages, however,
is signiﬁcantly negative for all samples. The eﬀect of the recognition of
Table 11.3 Model I, Estimated Eﬀort Function (Lee’s method), for
Promoted Employees






















Source: Data are from Tachibanaki and Maruyama (1993).
Notes: See table 11.1.
Promotion, Incentives, and Wages 343promotion possibility is positive for samples of those in lower positions,
while it is negative for samples of those in higher positions. This is consis-
tent with the fact that the number of explanatory variables that are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant on eﬀort incentive decreases when we look at employees
whoh ave been promoted to very high positions. This reﬂects the decreas-
ing role of the incentive mechanism in competition for very high positions.
In other words, the incentive mechanism works best for competition within
the range of lower positions.
Tables 11.6 through 11.10 show the estimated results for Model II, for
both eﬀort incentive functions and wage functions. They are estimated by
OLS as well as 2SLS. The distinction between OLS results and 2SLS re-
sults gets at whether it is useful to consider the nature of the endogeneity
in terms of eﬀort and wages. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect ofw a g e son eﬀort is
statistically signiﬁcant for the total sample, but not for samples of those
Table 11.4 Model I, Estimated Eﬀort Function (Lee’s method), for
Nonpromoted Employees






















Source: Data are from Tachibanaki and Maruyama (1993).
Notes: See appendix for an explanation of variables. Figures in parentheses are standard
errors. For sampleA ,samples are restricted to employees who are not promoted to section
head. For sample B, samples are restricted to employees who are not promoted to depart-
ment head.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
344 Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Tetsuya Maruyamawhoh ave been promoted to section head andp ositionsh i gher than section
head, such as department head and director. This is true even in the case
of the 2SLS method. Therefore, we conclude that when all white-collar
employees are considered, wages have an inﬂuence on eﬀort and incentive.
When only promoted employees are considered, wages have no inﬂuence.
The eﬀect of incentive eﬀorto nw ages is not statistically signiﬁcant for
either OLS or 2SLS results, implying that having a strong eﬀort incentive
does not increase the wage payment. Nor do wages decrease when an em-
ployee has a strong eﬀort incentive. This implies that wages are not aﬀected
by employees’ eﬀortl evel. Still, a strong eﬀort incentive leads to a higher
probability of promotion in the lower range of hierarchical positions.
Thus, eﬀorti si mportant for promotion in early stages of careers but not
important for wages. However, wages are aﬀected by the hierarchical posi-
Table 11.5 Model I, Estimated Eﬀort Function (Heckman two-step), for
Promoted Employees






















Source: Data are from Tachibanaki and Maruyama (1993).
Notes: See appendix for an explanation of variables. Figures in parentheses are standard
errors. For sample A, samples are restricted to employees who occupy the position of section
head or higher. The number of observations is 352. For sample B, samples are restricted to
employees who occupy the position of department head or higher. The number of observa-
tionsi s150.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Promotion, Incentives, and Wages 345tions. In other words, promoted employees receive considerably higher
wages than nonpromoted employees. Therefore, eﬀorti si mportant in or-
der to receive higher wages through the indirect eﬀect of promotion, al-
though the direct eﬀect ofe ﬀorto nw ages is negligible.
Theo verall result, in terms of both the number of statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients and the closeness of ﬁt, is excellent for the wage functions. The
wage model, which investigates how wages are diﬀerentiated by hierarchi-
calp osition and incentive, is explained fairly well by this speciﬁcation.
Thep osition variables (POSIT) are statistically signiﬁcant for all equa-
tions, implying that the eﬀecto fhierarchical position is always positive
regardless of the sample of white-collar workers. In other words, employers
pays i gniﬁcantly higher wages to employees who occupy signiﬁcantly
higher positions. Tachibanaki (1996) concluded that hierarchical positions
had the strongest eﬀect on wage diﬀerentials among employees. The eﬀect
of job tenure, shown by both a linear term and its square term, is strongly
signiﬁcant, suggesting that the shape of the wage-tenure proﬁle is convex.
Table 11.6 Model II, Estimated Eﬀort Function (OLS)
Coeﬃcient (A) Coeﬃcient (B) Coeﬃcient (C)
Constant 0.814** 2.116* 2.549
(0.414) (1.094) (2.204)
OPD 0.013 0.116 0.221
(0.051) (0.086) (0.143)
SAWD 0.668** 0.580** 0.635**
(0.051) (0.089) (0.145)
WVARD 0.128 0.189 0.131
(0.086) (0.130) (0.199)
PROSD 0.306** 0.243** 0.197
(0.054) (0.082) (0.137)
STD 0.245** 0.134 0.001
(0.061) (0.092) (0.146)
PVARD 0.178** 0.021 0.046
(0.055) (0.104) (0.173)
PNOTICED 0.052 0.004 0.116
(0.055) (0.098) (0.202)
WAGE 0.266** 0.103 0.063
(0.067) (0.166) (0.324)
R2 0.238 0.165 0.134
Source: Data are from Tachibanaki and Maruyama (1993).
Notes: See appendix for an explanation of variables. Figures in parentheses are standard
errors. For sample A, all samples are included. The number of observations is 1,037. For
sample B, samples are restricted to employees who occupy the position of section head or
higher. The number of observations is 337. For sample C, samples are restricted to employees
whoo c cupy the position of department head or higher. The number of observations is 147.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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employees who occupy higher positions (samples B and C). It was antici-
pated before we launched this exercise that wages would be unaﬀected by
job tenure for employees who were promoted to higher positions, because
the other factors would be more signiﬁcant than the job-tenure eﬀect for
these promoted employees. This turned out to be wrong. However, the es-
timated R2 is considerably lower for sample C, those who occupy very high
positions. Other factors, or unobserved factors, such as the employee’s
contribution to the ﬁrm, an assessment of the employee’s performance, and
so on, may contribute to wage diﬀerentials even among employees who
occupy very high positions.
The eﬀecto fjob tenure on wages is a controversial subject in many
countries. Some authors believe that unobserved heterogeneity of employ-
ees reduces the eﬀecto fjob tenure on wages, while other authors do not
Table 11.7 Model II, Estimated Wage Function (OLS)
Coeﬃcient (A) Coeﬃcient (B) Coeﬃcient (C)
Constant 4.937** 5.384** 5.253**
(0.083) (0.128) (0.219)
POSIT 0.079** 0.121** 0.114**
(0.015) (0.018) (0.033)
TENU 0.049** 0.036** 0.065**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.014)
TENU2 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PHD 0.014 n.a. n.a.
(0.020)
AGE 0.015** 0.009** 0.010
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008)
EDUD 0.233** 0.172** 0.089
(0.030) (0.034) (0.055)
SEXD 0.299** 0.205** 0.063
(0.035) (0.054) (0.088)
F1D 0.082** 0.043 n.a.
(0.031) (0.03)
F2D 0.013 0.055* 0.022
(0.031) (0.030) (0.044)
F3D 0.101** 0.139** 0.127**
(0.029) (0.022) (0.032)
F4D 0.005 0.113** 0.088**
(0.029) (0.026) (0.041)
EFFORT 0.010 0.012 0.010
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
R2 0.616 0.729 0.579
Source: Data are from Tachibanaki and Maruyama (1993).
Notes: See table 11.6. n.a.  not available.
Promotion, Incentives, and Wages 347believe it.9 Our study proposes that job tenure has a positive eﬀect (with
statistical signiﬁcance) on the wage growth, even after controlling for both
job positions and eﬀort incentive, although we do not propose that its
eﬀecti ssmaller than is popularly believed.
Our calculation suggests that the wage increase due to promotion to
department head is equivalent to the one due to having four years’ job
tenure. The comparable ﬁgure for promotion to director is two years’ job
tenure. Our calculation implies that promotion to department head in-
creases wage payment drastically. Since employees know this, they struggle
to obtain the position of department head, and it is regarded as a symbol
of promotion, power, or prestige by many employees (as Tachibanaki
1998b concludes).
The eﬀect ofa g eo nw a ges is also positive except for employees who are
department heads or higher (sample C). As Ohta and Tachibanaki (1997)
propose, the eﬀecto fa ge and job tenure on wages should be clearly distin-
guished, at least in Japan, with respect to its economic interpretation as
well as its statistical estimation. The eﬀect ofa g ehas some relation to the
9. In the United States, we can raise Abraham and Farber (1987) and Altonji and Shakotko
(1987) for the former, and Topel (1991) for the latter. Brunello and Ariga (1995), Genda
(1997), and Genda and Yee (1997) are useful for Japan and (South) Korea, respectively.
Table 11.8 Model II, Estimated Eﬀort Function (2SLS)
Coeﬃcient (A) Coeﬃcient (B) Coeﬃcient (C)
Constant 0.126 2.974** 4.744*
(0.567) (1.277) (2.768)
OPD 0.016 0.0113 0.214
(0.312) (0.086) (0.143)
SAWD 0.676** 0.559** 0.583**
(0.051) (0.090) (0.151)
WVARD 0.216 0.186 0.128
(0.086) (0.131) (0.199)
PROSD 0.284** 0.250** 0.223
(0.055) (0.082) (0.139)
STD 0.237** 0.144 0.000
(0.061) (0.092) (0.145)
PVARD 0.127* 0.037 0.093
(0.059) (0.104) (0.202)
PNOTICED 0.038 0.007 0.043
(0.055) (0.098) (0.173)
WAGE 0.419** 0.028 0.262
(0.092) (0.194) (0.408)
R2 0.242 0.164 0.142
Source: Data are from Tachibanaki and Maruyama (1993).
Notes: See table 11.6.
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necessary is his or her income. Still, employers do not take into consider-
ation this life-cycle aspect for employees who have been promoted to very
high positions.
The eﬀecto fe ducation (EDUD) and sex (SEXD) are not statistically
signiﬁcant for department heads and higher (sample C), while they are
signiﬁcant for employees who have not been promoted to very high posi-
tions.
We conclude that there are several unobservable factors that aﬀect the
determination of wages for employees who have been promoted to depart-
ment head. Which variables or factors are inﬂuential in the determination
of wages for employees who occupy very high positions will be a subject
of future research.
Tables 11.10 through 11.12 present the estimated results for Model III
Table 11.9 Model II, Estimated Wage Function (2SLS)
Coeﬃcient (A) Coeﬃcient (B) Coeﬃcient (C)
Constant 4.942** 5.415** 5.399**
(0.091) (0.143) (0.245)
POSIT 0.079** 0.122** 0.125**
(0.015) (0.018) (0.035)
TENU 0.049** 0.036** 0.064**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.014)
TENU2 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PHD 0.014 — —
(0.020)
AGE 0.015** 0.009* 0.011
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008)
EDUD 0.233** 0.168** 0.063
(0.030) (0.035) (0.060)
SEXD 0.299** 0.206** 0.059
(0.035) (0.054) (0.087)
F1D 0.083** 0.044 —
(0.032) (0.031)
F2D 0.013 0.053* 0.007
(0.032) (0.030) (0.046)
F3D 0.102** 0.137** 0.115**
(0.029) (0.022) (0.033)
F4D 0.003 0.108** 0.083**
(0.031) (0.028) (0.041)
EFFORT 0.008 0.002 0.029
(0.022) (0.024) (0.037)
R2 0.616 0.727 0.580
Source: Data are from Tachibanaki and Maruyama (1993).
Notes: See table 11.6.
Promotion, Incentives, and Wages 349Table 11.11 Model III, Estimated Position Function (2SLS)
Coeﬃcient (A) Coeﬃcient (B) Coeﬃcient (C)
Constant 2.148** 2.062** 0.204
(0.112) (0.263) (0.416)
TENU 0.136** 0.145** 0.067**
(0.008) (0.0172) (0.029)
TENU2 0.002** 0.001** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
EDUD 0.843** 0.956** 0.600**
(0.050) (0.072) (0.099)
EFFORT 0.295** 0.311** 0.123*
(0.043) (0.062) (0.070)
R2 0.550 0.561 0.259
Source: Data are from Tachibanaki and Maruyama (1993).
Notes: See table 11.6.
Table 11.10 Model III, Estimated Eﬀort Function (2SLS)
Coeﬃcient (A) Coeﬃcient (B) Coeﬃcient (C)
Constant 1.715 5.276** 4.119
(1.116) (2.163) (3.233)
OPD 0.026 0.116 0.213
(0.051) (0.086) (0.143)
SAWD 0.671** 0.519** 0.594**
(0.051) (0.095) (0.154)
WVARD 0.114 0.209 0.120
(0.086) (0.132) (0.200)
PROSD 0.239** 0.213** 0.269*
(0.058) (0.087) (0.161)
STD 0.198** 0.109 0.006
(0.064) (0.096) (0.146)
PVARD 0.084 0.032 0.069
(0.061) (0.105) (0.207)
PNOTICED 0.029 0.027 0.024
(0.055) (0.102) (0.177)
WAGE 0.119 0.413 0.118
(0.181) (0.351) (0.542)
POSIT 0.191** 0.203 0.194
(0.091) (0.156) (0.371)
R2 0.246 0.166 0.138
Source: Data are from Tachibanaki and Maruyama (1993).
Notes: See table 11.6.based on the 2SLS method. There are three endogenous variables,
EFFORT, WAGE, and PROMOTION, and many exogenous variables.
Since Model III is essentially a combined version of Model I and Model
II, we do not discuss it in detail here. It simply intends to ﬁnd the casual re-
lationship among hierarchical position, eﬀort incentive, and wages. An-
other important feature of tables 11.10 through 11.12 is that the model is
estimated for separate samples—total sample, employees who have been
promoted to section head and higher,a nd employees who have been pro-
moted to department head and higher—as in the previous tables.
In tables 11.10 through 11.12, the estimated results are best for “all
samples,” and inferior when samples are restricted to employees who oc-
cupy higher positions. This was also true in Models I and II and implies
that while the theoretical framework adopted in this study is supported for
all samples, it is not supported for samples of those who occupy very high
positions. It is likely that there are several unobservable variables for these
Table 11.12 Model III, Estimated Wage Function (2SLS)
Coeﬃcient (A) Coeﬃcient (B) Coeﬃcient (C)
Constant 5.290** 5.672** 5.140**
(0.159) (0.158) (0.212)
TENU 0.038** 0.020** 0.054**
(0.007) (0.010) (0.014)
TENU2 0.001** 0.000* 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PHD 0.018 0.010 0.014
(0.020) (0.020) (0.030)
AGE 0.008** 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
EDUD 0.143** 0.060 0.054
(0.048) (0.053) (0.065)
SEXD 0.291** 0.228** 0.177*
(0.035) (0.056) (0.090)
F1D 0.032 0.008 0.089
(0.038) (0.034) (0.056)
F2D 0.051 0.013 0.023
(0.041) (0.024) (0.046)
F3D 0.108** 0.153** 0.084**
(0.029) (0.032) (0.036)
F4D 0.043 0.153** 0.139**
(0.033) (0.032) (0.044)
POSIT 0.214** 0.267** 0.390**
(0.057) (0.054) (0.080)
R2 0.611 0.709 0.609
Source: Data are from Tachibanaki and Maruyama (1993).
Notes: See table 11.6.
Promotion, Incentives, and Wages 351samples, such as contribution to the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm’s performance in proﬁts
or sales, and so on.
Further, the principal causality proceeds in the following way: position
→ eﬀort incentive → wages. Position and eﬀort aﬀecteach other, but wages
have no eﬀecto ntheme xcept for samples of those who have not been
promoted yet.
11.6 Who Is Promoted?
Thep revious sections presented several models and estimated their pa-
rameters empirically. However, the results did not show who is promoted,
and on what criteria. This section is concerned with that question, al-
though the method of investigation is descriptive.
We use the same data source, including questions such as “What are the
reasons or criteria for the determination of promotion to department head
and director?” The questionnaire is based on self-assessment of white-
collar employees regarding the issue of promotion.
Table 11.13 shows the most important, second most important, and
third most important criteria for promotion to department head and direc-
tor, respectively. For promotion to department head, the most important
criterion is the performance evaluation of an individual employee. The next
most important is age and job tenure, followed by education. As for the
secondsetofimportantcriteria,ageandjobtenurearethehighest,followed
by performance evaluation and a manager’s “pull.” For the third set, mana-
gerial pull and personal character were about the same in importance.
Forp romotion to director, the most important criteria are the perfor-
mance evaluation of an individual employee and managerial pull. They
are virtually equal. Performance evaluation is less important for promotion
to director than for promotion to department head. Of secondary impor-
tance are managerial pull and performance evaluation, which rank almost
the same. Personal character is also fairly important. For the third set,
personal character is the highest—much higher than the other criteria in
the third set.
The discussion of promotion in Japanese ﬁrms may be summarized as
follows: Before being promoted to department head, it is crucial to have
excellent performance in business and to reveal one’s capability and pro-
ductivity to colleagues and managers. Since the eﬀects of age and job ten-
ure are quite important, too, even an extremely capable employee who
shows excellent performance cannot expect to be promoted extremely rap-
idly. At the same time, even a less capable employee, or one with inferior
performance in business, can be promoted up to a certain limited level,
although more slowly. The record of an employee’s performance during
his or her career is documented, however, and it is certainly used as infor-
mation for future promotion possibility.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.After being promoted to department head, the information on past and
current performance in business determines the possibility of promotion
to deputy director and director. At the same time, pull by superior manag-
ers becomes important at this stage. “Pull” is a mysterious element in the
following senses: First, it may be equivalent to favoritism, as (for example)
among relatives, graduates of the same university, or those with the same
personal likes and dislikes. Second, an extremely powerful and inﬂuential
manager is likely ﬁrst to pick and then to recommend a capable subordi-
nate for a higher position. Third, a much less capable employee, one with
inferior performance, cannot be a candidate for the inﬂuence of manage-
rial pull because the use of this inﬂuence would be judged unfair for such
ap erson. Thus, pull may be called “luck” in some sense. Finally, good
personal character matters to a certain extent.10
11.7 Concluding Remarks
This study investigated the relationship among promotion, eﬀort incen-
tive,a nd wages. Individual observations on white-collar workers in several
large Japanese ﬁrms were used to investigate this issue. We obtained the
following ﬁndings.
First, the employee’s position on the hierarchical ladder is crucial in
understanding the relationship among promotion, eﬀort incentive, and
wages. The eﬀect of wages on eﬀorti si mportant for employees early in
their careers or before being promoted. The higher the wage payment, the
higher the eﬀort from these employees. However, the crucial variable that
increases eﬀortf or employees in mid-career is promotion prospective as
measured by, for example, better performance in business. In the samples
of workers promoted to department-head level, there is no incentive mech-
anism that works. In other words, neither prospective promotion nor
wages aﬀects the eﬀort of employees who occupy very high positions. Un-
observable factors, possibly including managerial pull (or luck) are impor-
tant for these employees in terms of their promotion incentive.
Next, eﬀortc an be increased only for employees who are early in their
careers, or are lower on the hierarchical ladder. There are several methods
to increase the incentive for these employees: showing an explicit or im-
plicit sign of the prospect of early promotion; providing frequent internal
transfers among diﬀerent sections; or using information on the employee’s
capability and sharing it among other employees who are in very early
career stages. One important reason why the eﬀort incentive mechanism
works only for employees in early careers, or lower on the hierarchical
ladder, is that employees who have been promoted quickly to higher posi-
10. Tachibanaki (1998a) investigated promotions to the highest positions, namely to top
executive (board member), and presented several useful observations.
354 Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Tetsuya Maruyamationsh ave already shown their excellent performance and capability, and
thus they are highly motivated in any case.
Our estimated wage functions worked well even for white-collar employ-
ees.W ec o nﬁrmed the role of hierarchical positions in wage diﬀerentials
in this study. In particular, we found that the level of wages jumps consid-
erably when an employee is promoted to department head.
We also found age and job tenure to be eﬀective for the determination
of both the promotion possibility and wages. For the former, age and job
tenure were secondarily important to employees early in their careers, fol-
lowing performance evaluation. For wages, the eﬀect of job tenure was
prevalent even after controlling for the simultaneous presence of hierarchi-
cal position and job tenure.
Finally, what determines promotion, or how to select promoted employ-
ees, diﬀers according to the position. In other words, the decision-making
variables are diﬀerent for promotion to department head versus promotion
to director. Very simply speaking, performance evaluation of an individual
employee and job tenure matter for department head positions, whereas
performance evaluation and managerial pull perhaps matter for the posi-
tion of director.
What are the implications for human resource management in view of
the recent aging trend in the Japanese population and the slower growth
rate of ﬁrms in Japan? It is essential for ﬁrms to reduce the cost of labor
and, at the same time, to raise productivity of employees by increasing
their incentives. Competition among employees, in particular younger and
not-yet-promoted employees, is desirable to achieve such a goal. Competi-
tion in terms of merit, evaluated by the contribution and performance of
each individual employee, is likely to distinguish between capable employ-
ees and less capable ones in their early careers. Quicker promotions for




EFFORT: Work eﬀort compared with job requirements
4: contribution to the ﬁrm higher than required
3: contribution to the ﬁrm somewhat higher than required
2: contribution to the ﬁrm almost equivalent to requirements
1: needs somewhat higher eﬀort
0: needs higher eﬀort
Promotion, Incentives, and Wages 355PROM (or PROD): A dummy variable for promotion
1: promoted
0: not promoted
WAGE: Natural log of annual wage
OPD: A dummy variable for propensity to promote
1: strong propensity
2: no propensity
SAWD: Own evaluation of wage compared with contribution to the ﬁrm
1: wage is higher than contribution
0: otherwise
WVARD: Wage diﬀerentials among colleagues who were employed in the
same year
1: wide diﬀerential
0: small or no diﬀerential
PROSD: A dummy variable for prospect of promotion
1: expecting to be promoted to director
0: otherwise
STD: Satisfaction with wage payment
1: satisﬁed
0: otherwise
PVARD: A dummy variable for whether promotion is diﬀerentiated
among colleagues who were employed in the same year
1: yes
0: no
AGRD: Propensity to compete with other people
1: yes
0: no
PNOTICED: A dummy variable for whether promotion possibility is eas-
ilyr ecognized among workers
1: yes
0: no
TENU: Job tenure (TENU2 is its squared form)
PCAR: Years toward section head (PCAR2 is its squared form) for
samples of section heads and higher positions. Years towards department
head for samples of department heads and higher positions.
AGE: Age
SEXD: A dummy variable for sex
1: male
0: female
356 Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Tetsuya MaruyamaEDUD: A dummy variable for university education
1: university
0: otherwise
PHD: A dummy variable for specialty in university education
1: law and economics
0: otherwise
IND: The number of changes in job section before promotion to section
head
OUTD: The number of changes in job section before promotion to depart-
ment head
SHUKO: A dummy variable for temporary work in the subsidiary ﬁrm
1: yes
2: otherwise




F1D–F4D: Dummy variables for particular ﬁrms
POSIT: Variables for positions






EFFORT  X  PROM
PROM  Z  EFFORT
X, Z: exogenous variables;
Model II
EFFORT  X  WAGE
WAGE  Y  EFFORT
X, Y: exogenous variables;
Model III
EFFORT  X  PROM  WAGE
WAGE  Y  PROM
PROM  Z  EFFORT
X, Y, Z: exogenous variables;
Promotion, Incentives, and Wages 357where EFFORT may be interpreted as incentive, and PROM signiﬁes pro-
motion possibility where it is deﬁned discretely in some cases. Boldface
implies the possibility of such a discrete nature. WAGE is the annual
wage payment.
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